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Resumen: El estatus de la filosofía nunca llega 
a ser completamente comprendido debido, en 
parte, a su inutilidad. En un mundo enfocado 
hacia las metas, filosofar no sirve si no produce 
resultados materialistas. Un aspecto del pen-
samiento filosófico es promover actividades 
que son exclusivamente humanas y por lo 
tanto imposibles de simular por una inteligen-
cia artificial. La improvisación es capaz de 
revelar la importancia de la filosofía mante-
niendo la relevancia de la subjetividad. Con el 
fin de justificar la presencia de la filosofía en la 
universidad, una manera importante es que 
ésta mantenga la idea de que lo mental no 
puede ser reducido a lo material o a lo físico. 
Por lo tanto, la fenomenología, en defensa de 
la filosofía, llega a ser mas relevante cuanto 
más conscientes somos de que la filosofía está 
amenazada por la interdependencia del mate-
rialismo, la Inteligencia Artificial y la corporati-
vización de la universidad. 
 
Palabras clave: improvisación, materialismo, 
fenomenología, reduccionismo. 
 Abstract: The status of philosophy is contin-
gent upon the civilizations that embrace or 
undermine its importance. Such status is 
never fully understood, nor clear, due in part 
to its inutility. In a goal-oriented world, phi-
losophizing is pointless if it does not produce 
material results. One point of philosophy 
though is not only to recognize, but promote 
activities which are uniquely human and which 
therefore artificial intelligence could not possi-
bly simulate. Improvisation, as one such activ-
ity, can reveal the importance of philosophy 
as a discipline by maintaining the relevance of 
subjectivity. In order to justify the presence of 
philosophy in the university, one important 
way is to have philosophy maintain the notion 
that the mental cannot be reduced to the 
material or physical. Consequently, phenome-
nology in philosophy’s defense becomes more 
relevant the more we realize that philosophy 
is threatened by the interdependency of mate-
rialism, A.I. research, and the corporatization 
of the university.   
 
Keywords: improvisation, materialism, phe-
nomenology, reductionism. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION: PHILOSOPHY’S PLACE IN THE UNIVERSITY 
In the modern university, philosophy is a subject that is often overlooked. 
This is perhaps due to the label it receives as being ‘useless’. Immanuel Kant, 
Moritz Schlick notes, thought that philosophy could not be taught as a science 
and so, it should be taught as an activity (Schlick 42). We can grip the current 
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distaste that educational institutions are adopting towards philosophy, in the 
example of a higher education institution in Ontario: the OISE (Ontario Institute 
for Studies in Education). It revealed the fate of philosophy as a specific gradu-
ate program in the Institute when the ‘History and Philosophy of Education Pro-
gram’ synthesized with the ‘Sociology in Education Program’ to create the cur-
rent ‘Social Justice Education program’ (Department of Social Justice Educa-
tion). This shows one of the future possibilities for philosophy, that of being 
absorbed by already existing subjects or by new ones. The aim of being inter-
disciplinary for a university can either displace philosophy as a subject, labelling 
it as beyond any teachable discipline (supradisciplinary, as Kant hinted at 
above) or see it as already interdisciplinary. This latter notion can be seen par-
ticularly in the idea that there can be a philosophy of any type of discipline im-
aginable (i.e. the philosophy of science, of economics etc.). By not having phi-
losophy explicitly taught and clearly present in a university as a program of 
study, however, does not guarantee that students will know how to engage in 
philosophy. They will not know when they are philosophizing or not, which is 
neither fair to their academic nor their self-development. 
This paper will argue that philosophy should always be taught and studied 
as a distinct individual university subject. First this paper will argue for the im-
portance of philosophy by showing that it promotes subjectivity, and this will be 
juxtaposed to science’s materialist attitude which does not. To counter materi-
alism, this paper will secondly defend subjectivity through a phenomenological 
acknowledgement of meaning and care, which will be framed as unique human 
attributes. Finally this paper will show that improvisation is an activity that 
helps us recognize our uniqueness as humans by confirming our subjectivity. To 
begin, we must first see how the argument for the reduction of the mental to 
the physical (henceforth: MR) aims to eliminate subjectivity in order to claim 
dominance for physicalism, materialism and science. This MR argument, if 
proven, would theoretically allow for artificial intelligence (henceforth A.I.: the 
research field that uses digital computers to simulate intelligent behaviour) to 
become truly intelligent (Dreyfus XXV). Consequently there would be sound 
claims to frame subjectivity as an illusion because there would be no mental 
states like self-consciousness to make humans the unique entities that they 
are. The MR considers everything in reality, even the mind, to merely contain 
physical properties.   
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2. SUBJECTIVITY’S DEFENCE AGAINST SCIENCE THROUGH PHENOMENOLOGY 
The proof of the MR argument would decrease the need for philosophy and 
this would consider the study of subjectivity in the university to be in many 
ways superfluous. But through an analysis on subjectivity, meaning, care and 
improvisation, we can show that the mental is not likely to reduce to the physi-
cal. Despite the efforts and optimism of many scientists and philosophers of 
science who argue for this eventual reduction and resulting A.I., they also im-
plicitly support a disregard for philosophy. Though much of philosophy’s exist-
ence does not solely hinge on this MR argument, this argument is one of the 
most important protagonists assisting in the justification of the corporatization 
of the university. The university, the main promoter of philosophy, fulfills this 
role less the more corporate the university becomes. For that, the MR (and its 
materialism) is one of the pillars supporting the negative perceptions some in-
dividuals may have of philosophy.  
The naive belief in science and technology can be witnessed through the 
ever increasing promotion of the MINT and STREM occupations we see today. 
Such naivety is also promoted through the intellectual and academic efforts 
that aim at proving A.I. as actually having consciousness. By using phenome-
nology to show that there are human capacities that A.I. will never be able to 
replicate, such as the care human’s have for their existence, their value of 
meaning, and their capacity to improvise, it  can be claimed  that the MR is 
unachievable. A.I. under this phenomenological view will never be truly intelli-
gent via any type of consciousness. Phenomenology maintains its relevance and 
the relevance of philosophy throughout this project, by providing ‘ammunition’ 
for philosophy’s defence against encroaching materialism, not only in the uni-
versity but in the world in general.         
3. THE STATUS OF THE MENTAL UNDER MODERNITY 
In philosophical anthropology and the philosophy of mind, dualism is usual-
ly equated with Cartesian substance mind-body dualism. This dualism supports 
an immaterial mind for the human person, since this mind can deal with an in-
finite amount of situations, whereas machines are limited by mechanisms 
(Dreyfus 144). Dualism has been important for understanding human identity 
and consciousness, and positions itself between the poles of idealism and re-
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ductive materialism. Dualism is placed much closer to the idealist pole, howev-
er, in virtue of supporting the existence of a non-physical mind. One unsettled 
argument within this field of philosophy is whether or not mental states are 
mere epiphenomenal by-products of physical brain functions, and can thus be 
reduced to the physical or if mental states are essentially different substances 
and are irreducible to the physical. Jaegwon Kim for example considers mental 
states as mere epiphenomena that can provoke physical causation through su-
pervenience, in which mental causation is reducible to a productive physical 
causation (211). The importance of this field of philosophy for this study is 
clear. This field allows us to consider that the more materialism is considered 
true (despite the MR not being proven to this day) through the belief in the MR, 
the less philosophy can be seen as a worthwhile discipline in the university. 
Such a demarcation of philosophy is due to materialism giving more relevance 
to science and A.I., which vouch for materialism’s prominence for research in 
the university. Such materialism results in the framing of the mystery of con-
sciousness, subjectivity, spirituality and even God to be on their way to being 
eventually ‘debunked’. This will supposedly occur when the MR is finally proven.   
The mindset that the modern world has adopted today, one of consumer-
ism, capitalism and the value of the physical and material over any sort of spir-
ituality or non-physical phenomena, coheres with a materialist view of con-
sciousness. Hubert Dreyfus considers the West as having blindly accepted the 
idea that human behaviour is to be explained via a theory of practice, consider-
ing the human being an objective device merely responding to the influences of 
other objects via universal laws (144). Dreyfus explicates his issue with this 
sort of thinking; a mentality that has existed for over two thousand years, cul-
minating in the mindset we contain in the modern world we have today. This 
manner of thinking for Dreyfus: “assumes that an explanation of human behav-
iour can and must take the Platonic form, successful in physical explanation; 
that situations can be treated like physical states; that the human world can be 
treated like the physical universe” (144). The naivety involved in considering 
that science will one day reduce the mental to the physical is a product of the 
natural attitude (Husserl 168). This attitude holds a faith in science’s eventual 
explanation of everything. Such a faith overlooks phenomenological description 
and method. Its extreme optimism as a modern form of imperialism of ‘matter 
over mind’ and ‘physical over mental’ has become justified through today’s 
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technological domination over nature. The natural scientific attitude aims to 
prove that science can define consciousness, hoping to clarify that nothing (not 
anything) and ‘nothing’ (every void or phenomena) are inescapable from objec-
tivity’s reach. What this scientific mode of thinking seems to overlook is mean-
ing. Meaning is something that is uniquely human, and it is promoted and de-
tected by philosophy through phenomenology. More importantly, it is also 
something that cannot be explained scientifically as to why we need it or why it 
exists for humanity’s sake.  
4. MEANING THROUGH PHENOMENOLOGY 
We can state that meaning is derived phenomenologically because accord-
ing to the pioneer of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, the meaning of actions 
as phenomena derive from description instead of explanation (May 287). By not 
attributing meaning only to scientific truth derived from the natural attitude, 
phenomenology, by treating all experience as the experience of meaning (Der-
rida 30), does not aim at any causal or reductive explanations of consciousness 
(May 307). Phenomenology aims rather to provide a descriptive account of 
phenomena, which involves distinctions that provide clear understandings of 
the foundations of knowledge (Siewert 78). The method of phenomenology 
supports a transcendental ego, which can be conceived as providing a locus for 
meaning without reducing the ego to matter (Gutting 12). The support for such 
a transcendental and pure ego aims to show that we can attain meaning with-
out instigating any explanatory reductionism or initiating any complete de-
centering of the ego1 (May 307). As a non-reductive method, phenomenology 
does not reduce other individuals to objects. The phenomenological experience 
of others is experienced rather through ‘lived experience’, so the experience of 
alterity and other individuals themselves are not conceived as just other objects 
in reality, but as psychophysically constituted (Donohoe 78). Meaning is thus 
intersubjectively attained through a horizontal openness to otherness and an 
inherent built-in experience which does not limit meaning to empirical reality 
(Moran 109).   
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Human activity requires meaning or else it would have no reason to take 
place. If activity occurs without meaning, it is done so in a manner that is 
merely automatic. To protect meaning, we need to therefore protect the sub-
jectivity from which it derives, which is to protect immaterial consciousness. 
This implies the support of philosophy, since it is perhaps the most important 
discipline for dealing specifically with issues on pure subjectivity and immateri-
ality in secular and non-secular forms. Improvisation is an activity that justifies 
the need for philosophy and the existence of subjectivity. This allows us to 
frame improvisation as a uniquely human activity, in that it shows A.I. as inca-
pable of replicating such action. And so improvisation can be understood as an 
activity that science will never be able to exactly explain. Science is unable to 
explain why we as human beings create and give meaning to life and its activi-
ties. We as humans ‘care’ to live, and philosophy, among many of its activities, 
is the only discipline found in the university that aims to understand why. In 
contrast, the science of the MR aims to eliminate any human notion of ‘care’ 
because such a reduction hopes to show we are merely physically determined 
as material beings.  
Meaning reveals the notion that there are no fixed facts in the objective 
world to which computer programming could interpret as holding meaning. Phi-
losophy makes this distinction between fixed objective facts and meaning, 
which allows us to see philosophy as always being relevant to the human condi-
tion. Humans create meaning phenomenologically through intentionality, and 
this requires an element of subjectivity (Stevenson 137). If there were only 
objectively fixed facts detectable by computer programming, computers would 
then have to eventually become artificially intelligent. But we do not have just 
fixed facts to be revealed objectively. Humans create meaningful facts which 
change when there are conceptual revolutions (whether scientific or cultural), 
and so A.I. cannot create, detect or engage with meaning as humans do (Drey-
fus 194). Humans have the world organized by their interests and create facts 
based on their relevance (Dreyfus 212). Meaning, care and improvisation for 
example, along with interest and fact creation, are thus out of range for a com-
puter’s capacities.   
Gestalt psychology, which has various ideas compatible with cognitive psy-
chology, and which values the ‘here and now’ found in the experience of im-
provisation, supports the unique human attribute of meaning. We can see this 
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when we consider computer translation. Perception and thinking for Gestalt 
psychology are to be thought of as involving processes which are not only glob-
al, but which are not to be understood via sequences or operations. A.I.’s task 
of programming a computer to translate meaningful statements (semantics) to 
information (bits of syntax) for which a computer operates on, cannot therefore 
jettison the human translator who interprets for the computer (Dreyfus 78). 
A.I. thus needs humans to provide it with meaning, since it involves a cyber-
netics theory of information that in the end requires human interpretation. This 
theory was developed by Claude Shannon in 1948 to undermine meaning in 
favour of intelligence, by supporting a mathematical non-semantic theory of 
communication for data transmission (Dreyfus 77). Meaning can thus be con-
sidered the ‘lynch pin’ for A.I. Without meaning A.I. cannot be intelligent and 
on the flipside, without humans A.I. cannot have meaning.   
Science and materialism aim at the obliteration of meaning and this can be 
seen in Stephen Hawking. For Hawking, if science develops a string theory ‘to 
be’ the unified theory of physics, we would prove the MR because we would be 
hypothetically ‘smart’ enough to prove this claim (131). We cannot escape, 
however, from humanity’s ‘cry’ for meaning and this confronts Hawking’s views. 
Hawking considers that discovering such a ‘grand theory’ of the universe would 
end an epoch in humanity’s struggle to understand the universe (133). It would 
also undoubtedly change the landscape of university education and the value of 
philosophy, as such scientific reduction would undermine the need for philoso-
phy in many areas, particularly in philosophy of science and mind. One conse-
quence of the ‘theory of everything’, as mentioned above, would then have to 
be the proof of the MR, and thus the reduction of consciousness to the brain. 
After all, if such a theory is to provide humanity with the ‘mind of God’ (Hawk-
ing 136), then there are to be neither any ‘gaps’ between laws of physics nor 
between immateriality and its corresponding subjectivity. All supposed ‘gaps’ 
would be theoretically filled and all inconsistencies in physics eradicated with 
the ‘theory of everything’. One such ‘gap’ that science naively takes to be even-
tually filled is the ‘gap’ brought on by the measurability between the mind and 
body. This dichotomy is a form of modern dualism that lies within the confines 
of the Cartesian spirit. It is a dualism which aspires to reduce the mind to the 
physical body and in turn forge a mentality that threatens philosophy’s rele-
vance by undermining subjectivity. How then should we ‘mind the gap’?     
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Martin Heidegger claimed that the ‘gap’ for modern science between mind 
and body is a claim that is unjustified. This space for Heidegger is a result of 
adopting the scientific dogma that preaches treating only that which is measur-
able as being real, instead of the subject matter that is in question itself (Zolli-
kon Seminars 80). Mark Letteri gives assent to Heidegger’s notion and empha-
sizes that: “More strongly, science, because of its assumptions, tends to reduce 
phenomena to what is measurable. Science thus tends to reduce psyche to so-
ma. Such a reduction deforms our understanding not only of psyche but soma 
as well (8).’’ Letteri sees Heidegger as maintaining a holistic and relational per-
ception of human existence, demonstrating the one-sided rationale science en-
dorses for understanding humanity. Letteri clarifies that for Heidegger the body 
is a mere object when treated by science, and so to avoid this treatment we 
should see that we exist as a sort of ‘bodying forth’; a reality that is not meas-
urable, and thus escapes scientific modernity’s control, manipulation of meas-
urement, calculability, and pre-calculability (8). Human behaviour therefore 
should not be reduced to A.I. and thus should not be considered explainable via 
physics nor by information processing mechanisms that merely receive and 
process inputs. Not only should we support this claim because physics and ex-
perience do not contain any ‘reason’ to provide meaning, but also because 
physically, energy is constantly changing, and phenomenologically, objects in 
reality are experienced in a field of experience that is already organized for us 
(Dreyfus 100).   
5. SCIENCE IS A PHILOSOPHY 
Now we have seen in depth the one-sidedness of science’s perspective on 
humanity. The scientific monistic/materialist views on the mind-body relation-
ship consider the idealistic views as their polar opposite. Materialistic views 
support the idea that the mental and thus consciousness are physical, whether 
by-products of the physical or not. It is no wonder that philosophy is considered 
an enemy of science when we see the latter’s one-sided view of the world and 
humanity; however, it is also not surprising that universities which support 
their own corporatization coalesce with the materialist view of the world. This 
materialist view reduces the world, including mind, to objective calculations in 
order to justify the maximization of profit through university privatization 
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(Giroux 675). The link between materialism and corporatization is executed 
through increasing scientific research which aims to dominate the material 
world and allow those who support academic science to materially profit from 
it.2 
When it comes to the science and philosophy divide, there are important in-
sights into this dichotomy. When they are examined, they reveal philosophy’s 
interdisciplinary nature. Rosenberg states that: “philosophy is a fundamental 
prerequisite for understanding the history, sociology and other studies of sci-
ence, its methods, achievements and prospects [...] understanding science is 
crucial to our understanding of our civilization as a whole” (1). It is indubitable 
that this relationship would change if the MR was ever proven. The naive belief 
that it eventually will has already been sufficient to instigate the ‘turf wars’ we 
see between philosophy and science today. If the MR is indeed eventually prov-
en, most philosophy would most likely become (to the delight of many anti-
philosophers), ‘swallowed up’ by science. Such a dire situation would ironically 
be a form of ‘cannibalism’, since after all, science derived from natural philoso-
phy.  
Euclid’s work in the third century B.C. commenced the separation of science 
from philosophy which led to a slow yet steady ‘domino effect’. Newton gave 
birth to physics as a separate discipline from metaphysics in the seventeenth 
century A.D., Darwin separated biology from philosophy in 1859, psychology 
split from philosophy not long after, and finally logic eventually morphed into a 
separate branch called computer science (Rosenberg 3). The Greek creation of 
geometry and logic provided for the germ of A.I. and thus the MR. Since an-
cient times we have accepted the notion that reason could be reduced to a form 
of calculation, and so all meaning (semantics) could technically be reduced to 
rules (syntax); a notion that has dominated Western thought ever since (Drey-
fus xv). Philosophers such as Leibniz and Kant even considered that science 
would eventually reach its zenith and its explanations would not leave anything 
unexplained. The completion of physical knowledge through science would allow 
each physical law to fit with the whole of a universal scientific theory to the ex-
tent that a change in one law would have to delegitimize the entire structure of 
 
 
2 The anti-psychiatry movement is an example of a reaction to materialism’s pharmaceutical solution to 
mental illness.  
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such natural scientific theory; a notion that a fully evolved science could not 
permit (Rosenberg 62). Leibniz in particular thought that he could reduce 
thought to a manipulated system of numbers, and so the idea that reasoning 
equates with calculation was eventual expressed in the Calculus of George 
Boole and the ‘Analytic Engine’ of Charles Babbage (Dreyfus xviii). If the MR is 
ever successfully proven, philosophy runs the risk of losing any ground to stand 
on, and thus risks redundancy. Despite scientists and philosophers of science 
who may claim its importance to the field of science and humanity in general, 
how can philosophy defend itself against the ever increasing materialist view of 
the world?  
A.I.’s competence involves a theory that proceeds without context, and so 
it is argued that A.I. cannot reproduce human performance. Human action in-
volves ‘moment-to-moment’ behaviour, which by depending on context, reflects 
the impossibility of there ever being a complete theory of human behaviour 
(Dreyfus 103). As a result, subjectivity cannot be objectified; however, this 
does not prevent the monstrous amount of individuals who believe it can be. 
Despite humanity being faced with the possibility that it will never live to see 
the completion of science reaching its zenith, science is still considered today to 
be able to provide ‘in principle’ answers to all the meaningful questions in the 
world. We thus have a framing of science as destined to eventually reduce sub-
jectivity to objectivity (Rosenberg 5). The naive optimism of science and the 
attitude that accompanies it considers science as already having all the answers 
and designates philosophy as merely dealing with pseudo-questions. This is the 
sort of perspective that can cause the university to justify its corporatization 
and undermine philosophy as a valuable discipline and activity.  
The corporatization of the university is connected to the extension of a ra-
tionalist conception of objective knowledge or in other words, contemplative 
theory. This theory has been playing a part in the Western philosophical tradi-
tion since the time of Aristotle. David West informs that historically, a concep-
tion of theory as the contemplation of objectivity, thus of the unchanging and 
eternal, eventually combined with the Enlightenment and changed theory into: 
“an understanding of scientific knowledge as fundamentally instrumental” 
(119). From this, science and technology have become intertwined in order to 
manipulate the world, but to do so on a purely objective basis. As a result, ide-
alism, meaning, context, and subjectivity must be eradicated for such objective 
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manipulation to flourish. West informs that modern theory today unfortunately 
aims to: “transcend all purely subjective points of view, in order to attain an 
intersubjective and eternal truth. Much of the Western tradition of epistemology 
sees its task as establishing [...] this goal” (119). Again, we see a connection 
between science, technology, and modernity, working together to theorize that 
no ‘gaps’ in knowledge or reality shall escape the wrath of the ‘omniscient’ 
power of scientific objectivity. This promotion of materialism encourages uni-
versities to ‘sell out’, by succumbing to the demands of such materialism and 
the natural attitude with which it complies through increasing investment in 
scientific research.   
6. WHAT’S WRONG WITH SUBJECTIVITY? 
Human value is dependent on the fact that unlike robots or animals, human 
beings care to exist and take part in the world because it has meaning. Such 
meaning is appreciated by philosophy, which in doing so, provides the means to 
promote the human activities that reveal the beliefs and desires that provoke 
action. These subjective beliefs and desires in turn allow us to grasp that which 
provides action with meaning; a meaning that is not found via natural scientific 
explanations (Rosenberg 59). For that, we can understand why science wants 
to reduce consciousness and the mental to the physical. Such a reduction would 
allow science to explain exactly why humans do what they do. Scientists would 
supposedly have the capacity to locate the origin of any action within the brain. 
This has caused a debate between psychology and social science over how be-
liefs and desires cause and explain actions and whether this is physically causal 
or not. The origins of this contemporary debate began when the mental started 
to become considered physically causal in the late 1950s. At this time, Herbert 
Simon propounded the idea that by the 1970s, psychology would involve theory 
based on computer programs and ideas on intelligent behaviour would be sup-
ported by heuristic rules which digital computers would be able replicate (Drey-
fus 76). Alan Turing and Minsky contributed to the debate as they thought that 
humans could be considered ‘Turing machines’. Digital computers would thus 
be able to replicate human behaviour through data processes received from 
reality (Dreyfus 108).  
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The relation between mental states and physical action, in light of the un-
proven MR and our defence of subjectivity, shows that human behaviour cannot 
be replicated by computers. Rather, our behaviour contains and acts on mean-
ings which pertain uniquely to humans. Rosenberg states that the reason why 
the MR is unlikely is because: “if desire/belief–rational-choice explanation is 
after all non-causal, then [...] meanings cannot be captured causally, second, 
human action cannot be treated scientifically and, finally, the search for mean-
ings beyond human affairs [...] must transcend natural science” (60). Despite 
the tendency of material (non-cognitive) psychologists describing the mind as 
an information processor, this needs to be taken in a metaphorical sense only. 
The mind does not actually process information like a digital computer, because 
this would omit meaning (Dreyfus 77). The non-scientifically discovered mean-
ings humans prescribe to in life thus show how important philosophy is as a 
discipline. Philosophy does not neglect the subjectivity on which meaning de-
pends or synonymously, stands. This does not imply that science cannot sup-
port subjectivity in its system. Idealist philosophy for example has shown that it 
can work with science by linking with science through cognitive psychology.3   
For psychology to eventually become the sole authority on human behav-
iour, which is one goal the MR and A.I. research strive to reach, it needs to 
support materialist views on the self and see it as an object. However, we have 
seen that the self is not to be treated as a mere physical object if we want to 
understand it. The objectification of the self equates with treating its behaviour 
as acts that merely respond to other objects. The view of the self as object 
considers that the self is a device (a reflex machine) that responds to elements 
in accord with laws (a.k.a. David Hume’s empiricist psychology which has 
evolved into stimulus-response psychology) (Dreyfus 90). To support a non-
material psychology thus requires the support of idealist, intellectualist, or 
mentalist psychologies, which are placed today under the umbrella term cogni-
tive psychology. Cognitive psychology is thus more compatible with philosophy 
in general and idealist philosophy in particular. It treats the human self as an 
entity that according to Dreyfus, is thought of: “as an information-processing 
 
 
3 The issue this paper uncovers is the one-sided progression of science and its undermining of philoso-
phy, not vice-versa. Philosophy is an open discipline that can work in tandem with virtually any discipline 
or subject.  
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device (following) laws [...] understood on the Kantian model, as reasons, 
which are rules in the mind applied by the mind to the input” (90). It should be 
noted that empiricist psychology was valued quite intensively in the scientific 
world until it laid the groundwork for the introduction of the computer. The 
computer is the device that supports psychology without the need for an imma-
terial ego, which is why it is compatible with empiricist psychology. The idealist 
view of psychology on the other hand, does not involve a self that is to be per-
ceived as a quantified object. For Dreyfus, this means that idealist psychology 
avoided the self’s objectification by including subjectivity and thus an ego that 
was transcendental (90).  
7. PHILOSOPHY’S POTENTIAL FATE 
Philosophy can work with scientific disciplines to enhance their contribution 
to knowledge, but also to enhance itself. Whether supradisciplinary or interdis-
ciplinary, such cooperation can take place, but such contact with philosophy is 
compromised the more the university succumbs to operating as a corporate 
business that adopts market values (Giroux 670). These values do not view 
philosophy as a lucrative discipline, and so we often see philosophy competing 
with new disciplines, which displace its interdisciplinary role. Cultural studies is 
one example of a competitor for philosophy. According to Gayatri Spivak, cul-
tural studies, like philosophy, aims to be interdisciplinary as it: “must set up an 
active give-and-take with (history, anthropology, and comparative literature) 
[...] the educators must educate themselves in effective interdisciplinary teach-
ing” (188). Philosophy’s unique role is being undermined through this example, 
as its role of dealing with ‘normative questions’, an interdisciplinary task, is be-
ing taken over by other subjects. Though philosophy deals with the matters of 
what we should do, what ought to be the case in matters, good and evil, right 
and wrong, just and the unjust, all of which define cultures in terms of ethics 
through interdisciplinary means (Rosenberg 4), we see that other disciplines 
are taking over this role. 
The biggest threat we see philosophy facing today has been the material 
worldview, which is a Newtonian mechanical view of the world. For this view the 
world is a mere mechanism and such a world functions in a way that allows sci-
ence to explain the world through deterministic measures. We have seen above 
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that this determinism is limited today, however, by human behaviour’s in-
volvement of consciousness and subjectivity (Rosenberg 81). Consciousness 
and subjectivity prevent Newton’s mechanical theory of the world from being 
able to complete itself through a method of ‘reduction’. This method is respon-
sible for the natural attitude Husserl warned about in his work and which seeks 
to prove the MR. Rosenberg informs, it came about when: “Newton showed 
how Galileo’s and Kepler’s laws could be derived from his own theories as spe-
cial cases [...] this derivation of the laws of one theory from the laws of another 
[...] ‘reduction’. Reduction requires that the laws of the reduced theory be de-
rived from that of the reducing theory” (81). The threat philosophy faces from 
science can be derived from this ‘reduction’ of laws, which implies that there is 
the possibility philosophy can be reduced to or eliminated by science. But as we 
have seen, subjectivity will always retain a non-objective element which philos-
ophy values, which means for science to successfully reduce philosophy, it 
would have to eliminate subjectivity. In physical terms, improvisation, we will 
see below, does not allow for such a reduction.  
Reducing existing theories to theories that are more fundamental frames 
science as progressive and successively expanding its capacity to ‘explain’. This 
reveals scientific change as progress via reduction (Rosenberg 81). Philosophy 
stands as a potential target of such reduction, due in part to its intimacy with 
subjectivity. For science, viewed through the extreme lens of reductive materi-
alism, subjectivity is treated as just another ‘stepping stone’ for science to re-
duce. Such a reduction would permit science to complete its domination over 
knowledge, as the psychological sciences noted above would apparently be re-
duced to laws of biology. Philosophy can defend itself from the threat of sci-
ence, through the reciprocal protection it shares with subjectivity. We will see 
below that this protection depends on human activities such as improvisation 
which engage with context rather than scientifically aim to liberate itself from 
it.   
8. NO ESCAPE FROM SUBJECTIVITY 
When we hold philosophical views on science that see science as based on 
paradigms, we see that science progresses and functions in a relative manner. 
For Thomas Kuhn, science works: “by discarding some previously standard be-
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liefs or procedures and, simultaneously, by replacing those components of the 
previous paradigm with others. Shifts of this sort are [...] associated with all 
discoveries achieved through normal science” (66) Kuhn’s conclusions concede 
that the history of science is really a history of change, not progress, since sci-
ence is a creative undertaking just like other art forms. Rosenberg thinks 
Kuhn’s ideas on scientific paradigm shifts lead us to see science as: “no more 
objectively progressive, correct, approximating to some truth about the world, 
than these other human activities” (145). When we view science in this light, 
we are left with room for subjectivity in the face of materialism and its support-
ive ‘crew’: naturalism, empiricism and logical positivism. This ‘crew’ aims to 
reject subjectivity and degrade philosophy by maintaining for Rosenberg the 
four claims of: “first, the rejection of philosophy as the foundation for science, 
the arbiter of its methods, or the determinant of its nature and limits; second, 
the relevance of science to the solution of philosophical problems; third, the 
special credibility of physics as among the most secure and well-founded por-
tion of human knowledge; and fourth, the relevance of certain scientific theo-
ries as of particular importance to advancing our philosophical understanding, 
in particular, the Darwinian theory of natural selection” (161).  
Scientific naturalism and materialism naturally find themselves at odds with 
philosophy because they do not cohere with subjectivity nor any sort of ideal-
ism. This is further understood when we contrast science with epistemic relativ-
ism. Epistemic relativism takes knowledge and truth to be relative to a scheme 
of concepts and perspectives, and just as Kuhn noted above, also paradigms. 
This coheres with the idea that there is no objective truth (Rosenberg 171). 
Rosenberg notes that for Paul Feyerabend, we should embrace subjectivity’s 
role in science because science involves ‘methodological anarchy’ and cannot 
escape subjectivity because there is no way to choose a theory via cognitive 
bases (172). This in turn promotes subjective improvisation through creativity 
and originality. When we see that science is relative, we see that it is always 
subjective to a certain extent which promotes the presence of philosophy within 
the domain of science. In the social sciences, qualitative research is based on 
philosophical insights on subjectivity within the scientific method, and has suc-
cessfully shown that natural science and quantitative research cannot be our 
only methods for investigation. The latter are not capable of providing explana-
tions for semantic meaning or for human significance (Rosenberg 175). Mean-
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ing was shown above to be problematic for A.I. research, and so subjectivity 
and the philosophy that contributes to its relevance should be considered ines-
capably essential to scientific research. Such importance usually goes unnoticed 
as we have seen; hence philosophy’s struggle for relevance in the ever increas-
ing corporate university of today. 
9. CONTINENTAL OR ANALYTIC: WHICH ONE FOR SCIENCE? 
Although philosophy is composed of many different schools, and set be-
tween analytic and continental strands for example, philosophy today seems to 
emit the mood of rejecting the idea of being intimately connected to or a con-
tinuation of science in the natural scientific sense (Glendinning 26). This indeed 
sets philosophy against science, but the analytic branch can be considered 
more compatible with science in virtue of its history. In the 1950s for example, 
the President of the University of Washington, Raymond B. Allan, expressed the 
benefits of philosophy aiming to be analytic, and so being strictly objective in 
its quest for ‘truth’ (Glendinning 98). This is a claim that characterizes the ‘lin-
guistic turn’ in philosophy which has culminated in the emergence of analytic 
philosophy; the branch of philosophy that can be characterized as aiming to 
reach truth through the study of language, not through phenomena or studies 
of the mind (Flynn 124). Analytic philosophy discourages idealism, and so ideal-
ist philosophy often finds itself corroborating more with continental strands. For 
Enrico Berti, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, who were strong contributors to con-
tinental thought, allow us to see idealist philosophy as a philosophy that: “de-
nies the existence of unchangeable essences and, resolving reality in thought, 
which is a continuous process, dissolves substances, essences and the bodies 
themselves in moments of a single major process” (68). The value of such ide-
alist notions today counter the idea of there being only objective reality and has 
provided profound claims that display the impossibility of the MR.   
In idealist philosophy, subjectivity is embraced, as we see in Berti it is a 
philosophy that involves the notion that: “thought itself is a form of life, as 
proved today by the fact that the Mind-Body Problem is no longer addressed by 
the cognitive sciences by means of information technology or computer science, 
but especially by recourse to the neurosciences” (72). Martin Heidegger had 
ideas that are also important for the defence of subjectivity (despite their over-
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all aim at the ‘Being’ prior to subjectivity). Some of his ideas are useful for un-
covering the self’s illusions brought on by naturalism and modernity (Letteri 
15). These ideas have been helpful for recognizing the importance of philoso-
phy for understanding humanity and our existence, and so they are important 
for existentialism. Existentialism’s Kierkegaardian ideas on subjectivity provide 
alternatives to objectivity by valuing subjectivity and its truths, but not irra-
tionally. Thomas Flynn informs that existentialist philosophy rather, questions 
without denying the capacity of scientific reasoning to: “access the deep per-
sonal convictions that guide our lives” (9). 
Although Heidegger’s alternative to objectivity strays from subjectivity and 
objectivity, his existentialist tone allows us to counter objectivism. By not con-
sidering the human subject/self as a mere by-product of epiphenomenalism 
derived from language and culture, he gives credence to the subject as an 
equiprimordial phenomenon that emerges through language and culture (Mills 
135). This highlights the importance of phenomenology for understanding sub-
jectivity and consciousness. For Mark Letteri, Heiddeger’s thinking of being 
through phenomenology: “touches a deeper level of reality than the sciences 
can reach on their own, limited as they are by their own historically determined 
and indeed occluded points of origin” (5). Science is guilty of objectifying the 
human self and hopes to ‘seal’ the fate of any subjectivity deriving from the self 
through the MR, but also through the A.I. research that is designed to make 
such a reduction a reality. For that, Heidegger, though involving a sort of think-
ing that aims to abandon subjectivity and objectivity altogether, still provides 
ideas that can be used to affirm subjectivity and idealist philosophy in the face 
of materialism.   
10. WHY DO WE CARE TO EXIST? 
The detrimental effects of science on our understanding of the self pro-
voked Heidegger to claim that we need to reject all: “conventional objectifying 
representations of a capsule-like psyche, subject, person, ego, or consciousness 
in psychology, and psychopathology must be abandoned in favour of an entirely 
different understanding” (Being and Time 327). Though Heidegger was seeking 
a fundamental ontology that could be considered primordial to any sort of sub-
jectivity and idealism, he still aimed to discover new perspectives on reality in 
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order to counter naturalist and modernist conceptions. Naturalism and modern-
ism value science at all costs and thus threaten philosophy’s place in the world, 
and more noteworthy, in the university. When we experience the ‘worlding’ 
character of things in reality through philosophical means, which is neither a 
naturalist nor a modern perspective, Rudiger Safranski explains that we: “slide 
into a different order that is no longer the order of perceiving [...] it (a thing) 
assembles a whole world, in terms of time and space” (95-96). This unique no-
tion of reality is not how A.I. processes the world, as it cannot interpret reality 
as such. So the way we see things in reality as ‘worlding’ leads us, unlike A.I., 
to care to exist. Heidegger’s human Dasein, in its facticity as a ‘throwing 
thrownness’, retrieves meaning from the world which provokes it to have a 
concern for the world in which it finds itself (Letteri 15).   
The ‘care’ that the human being acquires through the world sets it apart 
from animals and robotic A.I., but also from a reducible modern Cartesian cogi-
to. The cogito involves a conception of the subject as one that fixes the mind as 
the centre of meaning in virtue of thinking, whereas Heidegger’s idea of a non-
fixed existence for the human is: “ahead-of-itself-already-being-in a world as 
Being-alongside entities encountered within-the-world” (Being and Time 327). 
The mechanized products of A.I. do not function in this transitory way, since 
they do not ‘care’. A.I. does not interpret meaning, because such interpretation 
is needed for the ‘care’ that provides for the unique characteristic of the human 
condition. Only a being that perceives an open horizon ahead of itself to enter 
can be a caring creature that experiences an open time horizon, and so ‘care’ 
should be conceived as a lived temporality (Safranski 157). This manner in 
which humans perceive the world through ‘care’ not only encourages humans to 
realise the importance of improvising in the world, but allows improvisation to 
be framed as a uniquely human possibility.  
11. IMPROVISATION AS PURE SUBJECTIVITY 
Improvisation is a human activity that characterizes our ‘way’ of being in 
the world, but this is not realised through a natural, scientific or modern con-
ception of the world. This distinction is important for self-discovery, since if we 
just focus on the uniqueness of human consciousness (the ego) and/or cogni-
tion (the cogito) we permit the possible objective reduction of the human self to 
IMPROV TO IMPROVE: THE IMPORTANCE OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY 211 
 
Investigaciones Fenomenológicas, n. 13, 2016 211 
 
a mere animal or artificially intelligent robot to occur. Heidegger, though not 
rejecting the importance of the physical brain and existence, aims to interpret 
Dasein (the human there-being) in its own essential fullness not its mere tech-
nical and mechanical attributes (Letteri 33). Letteri claims that since conscious-
ness is the presupposition for Dasein and not the reverse: “Consciousness and 
cognition [...] imply perspectives on the human being that Heidegger considers 
as unthought originally [...] Being there makes intelligible consciousness and 
cognition, whereas consciousness and cognition, even construed generously, 
cannot account for the elemental fact or truth of Da-sein as being t/here” (33). 
Such a notion propounds the impossibility of the MR, as it coheres with the idea 
that the use of memory for example (and we will also see below with the al-
tered states brought on by improvisation), cannot be comprehended via any 
natural scientific method. The scientific method merely highlights a tabula rasa 
approach to consciousness in which the mind is considered an empty container 
waiting to be filled by and with knowledge instead of as a being-in-the-world 
(Letteri 51).   
When we philosophically consider the bodily and mental attributes involved 
in the activity of improvisation, we can counter the scientific objectified concep-
tion of the human being. Heidegger underlies the importance of improvisation 
for being human, as he can be interpreted to frame existence as a ‘prolonged 
and stretched’ improvisation. Existence is to be conceptualized as a ‘bodying 
forth’, whereas for natural science the body merely exists as a physical object. 
Letteri frames Heideggerian existence as a: “dynamic and highly intricate ex-
panse of ‘‘heres” and “theres” through which Da-sein sojourns [...] Da-sein ek-
sists. Being-in-the-world is the sway of the human being as a pro-jective clear-
ing in being. The body as gross matter is visible, but bodying forth through the 
world is invisible [...] human experience as bodying forth is meaningful in the 
first instance” (51-52). Improvisation, as an activity that A.I. cannot replicate, 
defends subjectivity from being reduced objectively in virtue of being a ‘bodying 
forth’. Improvisation preserves human meaning from being explained by sci-
ence through any MR, and this reveals the relevance of subjectivity’s study in 
the university through philosophy. The unique relation humans have with 
meaning, in that they concomitantly create and recreate one another, can be 
understood through the ad hoc nature of improvisation, which is a nature phi-
losophy aims to recognize and explore.   
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Improvisation shows that the human manner of thinking is much different 
from that of A.I. Gilbert Ryle states: “Unfortunately one over-dominant part of 
our everyday ideas about thinking is the assumption that since a stretch of cal-
culating, say, or translating or anagram-tackling certainly does normally em-
body a succession of ‘mental’ moves, therefore to think is, always and essen-
tially, to go through a sequence of ‘mental’ leapfrogging. This step-after-step 
picture of cogitation is then apt, though not bound, to be hardened up into the 
picture of a compulsory sequence of [...] steps individually admitting of no 
spontaneity, selection, initiative or imagination” (71). Ryle is frustrated with the 
notion that human beings think like computers, in the sense of thinking via 
mere sequences instead of depending on meaning and immediate wit (72). 
Consequently, he considers improvisation as an essential feature of human 
thinking in which the present moment, in its meaning, is crucial for human ex-
istence. Ryle states that to respond to the present moment, implies: “a union of 
some ad hockery with some know-how. If he (or she) is not at once improvising 
and improvising warily, he (or she) is not engaging his (or her) somewhat 
trained wits in some momentarily live issue, but perhaps acting from sheer un-
thinking habit” (77). Thinking for Ryle therefore becomes known as an en-
gagement of wit under new situations, thus the application of a skill or compe-
tence within an opportunity, problem, or obstacle that is not programmed (77). 
Programming is what A.I. performs and so that which can distinguish humans 
from A.I. is improvisation. Philosophy is important for improvisation because it 
is the discipline that explicitly aims at producing thoughts on the uncovering of 
improvised meaning instead of just programmed responses to structural pat-
terns from habit. The more the university undermines philosophy therefore, the 
more it produces students who are more artificially intelligent. This provokes 
the idea that perhaps we should be more worried about humans becoming 
more ‘artificially intelligent’ beings instead of vice-versa (artificial beings like 
computers becoming truly intelligent).    
Through philosophy we have seen that A.I. will never attain human intelli-
gence, which implies that we must not jettison the non-material mind that re-
fers to subjectivity. Such an implication respects the notion that humans cannot 
be fully reduced to mere physical objects. Though this does not need to signify 
we have a theological spirit, it does signify that humans have rights that should 
protect that subjectivity. Such protection is essential to defend humanity 
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against the threat of being treated as slavish objects in a mere materi-
al/physical world. Philosophy stands up for these rights through its support of 
human capacities like improvisation, which defends subjectivity in particular by 
involving altered states of consciousness that further confirm such subjectivity. 
These states are subjective experiences which psychology has been unable to 
establish as having any objective manner in which to determine externally 
whether or not someone is indeed experiencing them (Farthing 206). Within 
improvisation, we attempt to escape our minds and thus our subjectivity, which 
involves an immediate experience that many different altered states of con-
sciousness share (Scheiffele 14). Such immediate experience shows that ideal-
ism and subjectivity, which are expressed and studied through philosophy, are 
important for understanding humanity in the face of science’s encroaching mo-
nopoly on this understanding. Such a non-scientific understanding can be inter-
preted through Schelling’s ideas of God coming into existence within and 
through the human subject. This was a claim that considered that nature is able 
to open its eyes within the human and in turn realise that it indeed exists (Saf-
ranski 200). If the human is nature’s medium to know itself, and the human 
knows itself through subjectivity, then it needs philosophy to accomplish its full 
understanding. Perhaps this is the manner we should view humanity, nature 
and reality, and the manner which the university should promote. Not as ob-
jects to be reduced to numbers for calculability and manipulation, but as involv-
ing an inescapable subjectivity that values improvisation’s capacity to improve 
our self-understanding. 
CONCLUSION 
The future of philosophy in the university will be shaped by university cor-
poratization and its vocationalization (Giroux 687). In many ways this material-
ist university model hinges on the MR., and though humans are becoming crea-
tive in new ways through technology, philosophy is not always thought of as a 
contributing factor. A.I. has been shown to require the human ‘touch’ in order 
to involve any sort of meaning, so we can negate the claim that computers ac-
tually do create meaning (Simon and Newell 6). The university was once re-
sponsible for constructing the intellectual and spiritual world (Ott 179), so per-
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